Court: APPEALS COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
Citation: 13 Mass. App. Ct. 950
Parties: PDM PLUMBING & HEATING, INC. vs. FRED J. FINDLEN &
others. (Rescript Opinions.)
Decision Date: February 17, 1982
The single issue on appeal is whether in the circumstances presented here it
was proper for the master to apply an arithmetic procedure known as the
"Eichleay" method in computing the office overhead component of the
damages incurred by a subcontractor on account of a delay in construction
attributable in part to the owner and in part to the general contractor. The
master found that the delay caused "the plaintiff to incur added costs
[among others] for . . . office overhead." After overruling the
defendants' objections to the master's report a judge of the Superior Court
adopted the report, and judgment was accordingly entered on the report.
The "Eichleay" method utilizes a formula designed to determine office
overhead expenses resulting from a breach of contract where such expenses are
not capable of precise measurement. The formula attempts to establish a daily
overhead expense rate chargeable to a particular contract by allocating total
overhead among all contracts based upon the percentage the dollar volume of any
one contract bears to the dollar volume of all contracts over the same period.
See, e.g., Eichleay Corp., 60-2 B.C.A. par. 2688 (CCH 1960).
In circumstances such as those presented here the master was not compelled to
use any one particular method of computing office overhead expenses
attributable to the period of the delay; it was only necessary for him to use a
fair method. Where there is no precise method available to determine such an
expense, the test is whether the method adopted is reasonably calculated to
measure the loss resulting from the breach. See
Page 951
5 Corbin, Contracts Section 1029 (1964). We think that resort to a formula
logically calculated to establish a reasonable basis for recovery is proper.
Cf. McKenna v. Begin, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 310 (1977). As the order of
reference to the master did not require him to report the evidence, both the
trial judge and the appellate Justices are required to treat his findings of
fact as binding "unless they are clearly erroneous, mutually inconsistent,
contradictory or vitiated in view of the controlling law." John F. Miller
Co. v. George Fichera Constr. Corp., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 494, 495 (1979). See
Wormstead v. Town Manager of Saugus, 366 Mass. 659, 660 (1975). Based on the
master's subsidiary findings, not shown to be clearly erroneous, we conclude
that the computations made by the master were reasonably calculated to achieve
a fair estimate of the plaintiff's actual damages attributable to increased
overhead expenses.
We agree with the plaintiff that neither F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co. v.
Hartney, 308 Mass. 407 (1941), nor Berley Indus., Inc. v. New York, 45 N.Y.2d
683 (1978), requires a different result. See discussion in Roblin Hope Indus.,
Inc. v. J. A. Sullivan Corp. (No. 2), 11 Mass. App. Ct. 76, 77-80 (1980). In
the Bartlett Tree Expert Co. case, the court was concerned with the amount of
damages recoverable by the company from a former employee for breach of the
employee's contract with the company in obtaining work which the company would
otherwise have obtained. The court awarded no overhead costs because it found,
at 412, that "the overhead costs of the plaintiff . . . were not
materially decreased by the loss of orders . . ., and also that had the
plaintiff executed those orders its overhead would not have been materially
increased." In the Berley case, unlike the situation here, there was a
question whether any office overhead costs actually were attributable to delay.
In the instant case, the master specifically found that the plaintiff had
incurred office overhead costs during the delay, and he used the
"Eichleay" formula merely to compute the amount of such damages
because of the difficulty of achieving a precise measurement. The master's
subsidiary findings disclose no basis for requiring use of a different formula
of allocation.
Judgment affirmed.
END OF DECISION