Court: U.S. FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
Citation: 56 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 1995)
Parties: ADMIRAL DRYWALL, INC. vs. CULLEN
Docket No. 95-1036
Decision Date: June 8, 1995
Judges: BOUDIN, ALDRICH AND BOWNES, SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES
Peter J. Gagne with whom Corwin & Corwin was on brief for
appellants.
Robert Owen Resnick with whom Posternak, Blankstein & Lund was on
brief for appellee.
AULDRICH, J. John F. Cullen is the trustee in bankruptcy of Vappi & Co.,
Inc., a general contractor who defaulted after substantially completing its
contract to build a condominium complex. Plaintiffs, Admiral Drywall and
others, are unpaid subcontractors who furnished labor and materials, and seek
to impose an equitable lien on undisbursed
contract funds ahead of the trustee and all other creditors. They did not file
statutory liens, nor was there a surety bond or any other contract for their
protection. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's summary judgment
in favor of the trustee. We affirm.
We look to Massachusetts law for determination of interests in assets of the
bankruptcy estate. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979). In Ehrlich
v. Johnson Service Co., 272 Mass. 385, 172 N.E. 508 (1930), a general
contractor, within four months of bankruptcy paid some of its subcontractors,
and its trustee in bankruptcy sued to recover. Defendants claimed they
had equitable liens. The court held that, in the absence of any special
contract, they had none, and hence the payments to
them were voidable preferences. Plaintiffs here, who likewise have no
protection of a surety, and no special contract otherwise, can escape
foreclosure of their equitable claim only by persuading us that Ehrlich is no
longer law.
Plaintiffs would reach that result by pointing out that in Canter v.
Schlager, 358 Mass. 789, 267 N.E.2d 492 (1971), the court recognized
subrogation rights. There it held that a surety on a performance bond that paid
subcontractors has a priority "right of subrogation over the rights of a
construction contractor's trustee in bankruptcy." 358 Mass. at 792, 267
N.E.2d at 494. Strictly this meant priority for the surety who was
"subrogated . . . to the rights of the subcontractors it paid."
Id. at 791, 267 N.E.2d at 494. This differed from Ehrlich where subcontractors
were held to have no special rights because here there was a contract. The
subcontractors had rights because "they are entitled to rely on a payment
bond providing expressly that they may sue thereon." Id. at 795, 267
N.E.2d at 496. The court noted, further, that, unlike Ehrlich, the surety was
not claiming, timewise, in violation of the Bankruptcy Act. "[T]he
surety's right dates back to the date of the bond." Id. at 795-96, 267
N.E.2d at 496. For present plaintiffs, who lack a bond, and such timeliness,
these are fatal distinctions.
Since we are concerned with state law choices in the treatment of creditors,
and not federal law, it is pointless for plaintiffs to argue that Canter's
reasoning and its treatment of subcontractors' rights as depending upon the
presence of a surety bond was inconsistent with Ehrlich, and therefore must be
taken as overruling Ehrlich -- although it said it distinguished it. Our sole
duty is to take state law as we find it, not build on it. Nor would we be
tempted to build. There is sound
public policy in recognizing a difference when there is a surety in the
picture. "Traditionally sureties compelled to pay debts for their
principal have been deemed entitled to reimbursement." See Pearlman v.
Reliance Insurance Co., 371 U.S. 132, 136 (1962). If they were not, there would
be few sureties. Individual subcontractors can seek mechanics
liens. Mass. Gen. L. c. 254.
Affirmed.
End Of Decision.